The cloth is woven from this chapter's 5 exhibits: each weft is one exhibit's own data, normalised; each warp group is a section. The probe reads the exhibit's own value where it crosses. Procedural visualisation, not a measurement.
EX 33
EX 35
EX 36
The chapter as a draft: 7 sections, 3 exhibit wefts, one shuttle.
Lead exhibit · 33Decision mapillustrativeEach proposed subsidy needs a matching market failure
01 / 05
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Method and source
GFT constructed screening positions, not market measurements or institutional scores. Higher specificity requires transaction evidence. Higher capture risk requires stronger controls or rejection. Candidate responses: preparation evidence gap, separately procured technical assistance; unproven ramp data, bounded risk-sharing plus measurement; tenor mismatch, the smallest maturity or payment adjustment that works; generic policy ambition, no concession; unpriced public benefit, support only after outcome and incremental-cost evidence.
Unit: illustrative ordinal scores from 0 low to 10 high. Status: illustrative. Sources: S03, S04. Illustrative figures are teaching examples, not measured factory results.
The chapter's warpBar: share of the reading · square: an exhibit
Blended finance is justified only when an evidenced financing obstacle prevents a worthwhile textile venture from proceeding on commercial terms, and when a defined concession can remove that obstacle without transferring unnecessary value to private parties. The answer is not to find the cheapest money. It is to diagnose the failure, establish the counterfactual, calculate the minimum support, trace its beneficiaries, and withdraw it when the obstacle has fallen. GFT recommends that no concessional tranche enter the capital structure until those tests have produced an inspectable record.
¶ 01
A development objective is not itself evidence of financing additionality. Nor does the presence of a development-finance institution make its whole investment concessional. The OECD's 2025 guidance observes that blended finance has mobilised relatively limited private finance compared with earlier hopes, which is a reason to scrutinise the mechanism rather than assume that blending creates scale.[S03] This chapter applies that discipline to a hypothetical first line. Its rates, losses and capital shares are illustrative design cases, not lender quotations, GFT results or financing commitments. It is not investment, legal or tax advice.
Commercial finance and concessional finance answer different questions
Commercial finance asks whether the expected return compensates the provider for the risks and costs it must carry. Concessional finance asks a second question: what public or donor-supported contribution is needed to make an otherwise unavailable transaction possible, and why is that contribution justified? IFC describes blended solutions as debt, equity, risk-sharing or guarantees with different rates, tenors, security or rank, tailored to specific market barriers. Its own-account investment and the concessional contribution therefore need separate identification.[S04]
This distinction prevents a common labelling error. A development-finance loan at ordinary commercial terms is not a subsidy merely because the lender has a development mandate. Conversely, a concessional guarantee may carry substantial value even when no grant cheque is paid. The analysis must compare actual rights and cash flows, including repayment priority, fees, maturity, coverage and recourse. The instrument name cannot settle the question.
¶ 02
A market-failure hypothesis must then locate the obstacle inside the proposed transaction. An information barrier may prevent financiers from distinguishing a well-controlled ramp from an uncontrolled one. A demonstration cost may produce learning for later factories that the first sponsor cannot fully capture. A coordination problem may leave metering, safeguard and training work unfunded because each financier expects another party to pay. An unpriced public benefit may justify support where the venture cannot collect revenue for the wider outcome. These are competing hypotheses, not conclusions about Cameroon or about GFT's programme.
¶ 03
Ordinary commercial weakness is not a market failure. A factory with negative operating cash, unacceptable quality or no credible route to customers does not become financeable because a donor absorbs part of the loss. High risk alone is also insufficient. Private capital routinely prices and carries risk. The sponsor must show why the relevant risk cannot be borne, measured or priced efficiently, and why the proposed intervention changes that condition rather than merely improving returns.
¶ 04
Exhibit 33 illustrates the screening logic. The axes are constructed scores, not observed ratings. Specificity means the quality of evidence linking a defined obstacle to the financing gap. Capture risk means the possibility that support mainly benefits parties that would have financed or owned the venture anyway. Each position still requires the counterfactual and minimum-concession tests that follow.
The matrix deliberately leaves no automatic pass. A preparation evidence gap may suit a repayable preparation facility better than a permanent interest subsidy. An unproven ramp may require sponsor equity and better records before any public risk-sharing is defensible. An asserted public benefit needs a baseline, an incremental-cost calculation and a route to verify the outcome. A generic policy ambition fails because it identifies no transaction-level obstacle at all.
¶ 06
The distortion test runs alongside the rationale. IFC's principles call for minimum concessionality, commercial sustainability and markets that are reinforced rather than distorted.[S04] For a first textile line, the practical question is whether support allows a new financing capability or operating record to emerge, or whether it gives one sponsor an enduring cost advantage while competitors remain outside the subsidised circle. The latter may still be proposed in exceptional circumstances, but it needs a much stronger public-value case and a credible end point.
8.23 min · 8 paragraphs · read with a related exhibit
The counterfactual must show why the project does not proceed otherwise
Related · chapter 118 paragraphs step it
Related exhibit 49 · chapter 11FlowillustrativeImpact claims need a causal chain and an attribution limit
01 / 06
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Method and source
GFT proposed theory of change informed by the opened AIMM architecture. It is not an official AIMM assessment. Development impact uses a no-project counterfactual; financing additionality uses a separate without-this-financier test. No outcome or market effect is claimed achieved.
Unit: illustrative results chain. Status: illustrative. Sources: S26. Illustrative figures are teaching examples, not measured factory results.
The counterfactual is the same decision examined without the proposed concession. It must preserve the production scope, evidence quality, timing basis and commercial alternatives. Otherwise the comparison becomes theatrical: a fully prepared subsidised project is set against an imaginary commercial project with incomplete diligence, unrealistic debt or free preparation. GFT recommends building both cases from one controlled model and changing only the financing terms and actions that the support genuinely affects.
A commercial-only case should begin with finance that is actually available or credibly testable. Record the provider, instrument, amount, currency, tenor, payment schedule, security, conditions and evidence status. A declined application should record the stated reason and the proposal version reviewed. An absent application proves nothing. Equally, a refusal does not prove a market failure if the proposal omitted essential cash-flow, sponsor, safeguard or collateral evidence. The purpose of the log is to separate information deficiencies from a residual financing barrier after remediable weaknesses have been addressed.
The failure should be named in the language of the model. A coverage failure means operating cash cannot support the proposed service under an agreed downside. A tenor failure means available repayments fall due before the ramp can generate the required collections. A risk-appetite failure means providers decline a defined exposure even after the evidence pack is complete. A preparation failure means the sponsor cannot rationally fund studies or capability work whose benefits extend beyond the immediate equity case. An execution-capability failure means the venture lacks the controls needed to make the financing evidence dependable. Each points to a different instrument.
A single counterfactual can therefore produce different decisions. If the project proceeds on the same terms and timetable without support, financing additionality is absent. If it proceeds later or at a smaller, less useful scale, the analysis must value that specific change rather than claim the whole project as additional. If it cannot proceed because cash flows remain structurally negative under every reasonable operating case, the correct response is redesign or rejection, not a larger concession. If it cannot proceed only because no party has yet paid for verifiable preparation, targeted assistance may be the narrower intervention.
Development impact requires another counterfactual. IFC's AIMM guidance states explicitly that the framework assesses expected development impact, not additionality. It describes development impact as expected project results and additionality as financial and non-financial value provided to clients. The same guidance asks what would have happened in the absence of the project, even where the project might proceed without IFC financing.[S26] These distinctions prevent a sponsor from counting every job, garment or saving as evidence that concessional finance was necessary.
The two questions can produce opposite answers without contradiction. A venture may promise valuable local processing outcomes yet need no subsidy because commercial capital is already willing. Another may face a genuine financing barrier but produce weak or uncertain development outcomes. A third may pass both tests and still fail minimum concessionality because the requested support exceeds the residual gap. The approval record should show the three decisions separately: financing additionality, expected development contribution and efficient subsidy.
Attribution also needs restraint. If concessional support changes a loan's maturity while sponsor equity, buyer contracts and engineering improvements change at the same time, the resulting performance cannot be assigned wholly to the concession. GFT recommends recording the causal contribution expected from each action and the evidence that would isolate it. Where isolation is impractical, report the combined result and state the attribution limit instead of manufacturing precision.
A usable counterfactual ends with a decision rule. Proceed with blending only when the unsupported case fails for a stated reason, the supported case removes that reason, and no smaller intervention would do so. Keep the unsupported model live after financial close. It is the reference against which later claims of mobilisation, improved terms and reduced dependence must be tested.
8.34 min · 9 paragraphs · 1 exhibit
Minimum concessionality requires more than a cheaper rate
Exhibit 349 paragraphs step it
Exhibit 34RegisterderivedGrant-equivalent arithmetic requires a declared reference
Case
Reference, 10 percent
Year 1
43.3
Year 2
40
Year 3
36.7
Present value
100
Grant equivalent
0
01 / 03
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Open the full register (3 rows)
Reference, 10 percent
43.3
40
36.7
100
0
Concession A, 6 percent
39.3
37.3
35.3
93.2
6.8
Concession B, 4 percent
37.3
36
34.7
89.7
10.3
Method and source
Derived from assumed principal 100, three equal annual principal payments, annual opening-balance interest, no fees and annual discount rate 10 percent. Reference rate 10 percent; alternatives 6 percent and 4 percent. PV = sum of year-t total payment / 1.10^t. Grant equivalent = 100 - PV. Full-precision results: 6 percent PV 93.1580265, GE 6.8419735; 4 percent PV 89.7370398, GE 10.2629602. No market rate, lender quote or sufficient-price finding is asserted.
Concessionality is the value transferred through terms that are more favourable than a defensible reference. It can sit in the interest rate, but also in grace, maturity, subordination, security, guarantees or performance payments. A low coupon attached to a short, rigid loan may provide less support than a smaller pricing change attached to the maturity the ramp actually needs. Minimum concessionality means using the least valuable contribution that removes the evidenced obstacle, not simply selecting the lowest nominal rate.
The reference must be declared before the saving is celebrated. IFC explains that its concessionality calculation compares a reference price, which may be a market price, a modelled price reflecting risk, cost and net profit, or a negotiated client price, with the concessional price charged by the co-investment.[S04] GCF's investment framework likewise describes concessional funding as below-market and calls for grant-equivalent accounting so that different instruments can be compared. It also states that loans should support financially sound revenue-generating activities.[S10] Neither source supplies a reference rate for this textile case.
A transparent grant-equivalent calculation uses matching dates and consistent cash-flow definitions. Identify the reference and concessional payments, including principal, interest and fees. Discount each series using a stated currency, timing and rate convention. The difference between their present values is the estimated grant equivalent on that convention. Where the concessional provider funds only part of a loan, calculate on that part rather than the whole facility. Where a guarantee has no scheduled coupon difference, its valuation needs explicit coverage, fee, default and recovery assumptions rather than a made-up interest saving.
The discount rate is not a neutral detail. Choosing the reference lending rate as the discount rate makes the reference loan's present value equal to its initial principal under a standard fully serviced loan, which provides a useful arithmetic check. It does not prove that the same rate is the correct economic discount rate for every stakeholder. A public provider may also report budget cost, expected loss or opportunity cost separately. Those measures answer different questions and should not be mixed into one subsidy figure.
Exhibit 34 preserves the cash flows behind that conclusion. The table is derived entirely from the illustrative assumptions. Rounding is to three decimals, so displayed rows may differ slightly from a full-precision recalculation. The zero grant equivalent on the reference row is a convention check, not a statement that commercial lending has no cost or risk.
The worked example does not prove that the illustrative 6 percent option is sufficient. Sufficiency comes from the counterfactual: the financier must accept the exposure, the venture must meet its obligations under the downside, and the barrier must disappear. If a guarantee or technical-assistance package achieves that result at lower public cost, the cheaper loan is not minimum concessionality. If the 6 percent loan leaves a defined coverage gap, the analysis should test maturity, grace or risk-sharing before cutting the rate further.
Alternative instruments also need comparable boundaries. A training grant has an immediate cash cost but may leave no financing claim. A subordinated loan has a present-value concession and a possible recovery. A partial guarantee has fees, a contingent public exposure and an expected recovery that cannot be read from its nominal coverage. Present each result with its assumptions, and avoid ranking a certain cash outlay against an unvalued contingent promise as though the latter were free.
Finally, minimum concessionality must be tested against private benefit. A concession can increase sponsor returns, protect an existing lender or reduce the price paid by customers. Those are not automatic reasons for rejection, but the approval record should identify the beneficiary and explain why the transfer is necessary. IFC expressly links its case-by-case analysis to avoiding undue private subsidy and undue public risk.[S04] The smallest effective contribution is therefore both a valuation discipline and a governance control.
Interlude · the cloth half-woven
5 exhibits carry this chapter's argument.
Woven: sections 8.0 to 8.3Still to weave: 8.4 to 8.7
Exhibit 35 · illustrativeFirst-loss support changes the allocation of downside
Capital claims
Capital claims: total 1,000. Running total 1,000 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
First-loss capital is a contractual allocation of downside, not a disappearance of downside.
Sponsor equity loss
Sponsor equity loss: removes 400. Running total 600 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
Concessional loss
Concessional loss: removes 100. Running total 500 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
DFI senior loss
DFI senior loss: removes 30. Running total 470 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
Private senior loss
Private senior loss: removes 20. Running total 450 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
Realisable recovery
Realisable recovery: total 450. Running total 450 illustrative XAF million · illustrative
Method and source · Exhibit 35
Constructed stress, not a recovery forecast or legal ranking. Claims = sponsor equity 400 + concessional first loss 100 + DFI senior 300 + private-bank senior 200 = 1000. Recovery 450 goes entirely to senior claims, shared pro rata: DFI receives 270 and loses 30; private bank receives 180 and loses 20. Equity loses 400 and concessional first loss loses 100. Losses 400 + 100 + 30 + 20 = 550; 1000 - 550 = 450. Enforcement costs, taxes and other claims excluded.
Unit: illustrative XAF million. Status: illustrative. Sources: S04. Illustrative figures are teaching examples, not measured factory results.
8.4 · the bodyExhibit 35 above; its figures are illustrative where marked.
First-loss capital is a contractual allocation of downside, not a disappearance of downside. The documents must define which loss is being allocated, when it is measured, which claims rank where, and what happens to later recoveries. An operating cash shortfall, a covenant breach, a payment default and an insolvency recovery shortfall are different events. A structure that calls them all losses would make the public exposure impossible to assess.
The financing model should show two related but separate schedules. The cash schedule records whether each tranche receives interest, principal, dividends or fees during operation. The recovery schedule allocates realisable value after the defined stress or enforcement event. Payment blockage during operation does not necessarily determine legal ranking on enforcement. Security, intercreditor terms, insolvency law and enforcement costs require transaction-specific advice. No illustrative waterfall can settle those questions.
¶ 02
For a constructed stress, Exhibit 35 uses the paper's XAF 1,000 million capital scale but changes the junior tranche into expressly illustrative concessional first-loss capital. Sponsor ordinary equity is XAF 400 million, concessional first-loss capital is XAF 100 million, and commercial senior claims total XAF 500 million, split into DFI own-account exposure of XAF 300 million and private-bank exposure of XAF 200 million. Realisable value is an assumed XAF 450 million, with the senior claims sharing recovery pro rata.
¶ 03
…35 uses the paper’s XAF 1,000 million capital scale but changes the junior tranche…illustrative
In that illustrative allocation, the sponsor loses its full XAF 400 million and the concessional provider loses its full XAF 100 million. The DFI receives XAF 270 million and loses XAF 30 million. The private bank receives XAF 180 million and loses XAF 20 million. The total loss is XAF 550 million, leaving XAF 450 million of recovery. The arithmetic shows risk transfer with complete transparency; it does not make that transfer desirable.
¶ 04
…sponsor loses its full XAF 400 million and the concessional provider loses its full…illustrative
Now consider a separate illustrative commercial-only loss comparison, not a claim that this commercial structure would actually be funded. Replace the concessional XAF 100 million with additional senior capital in the same DFI-to-private proportions. Senior claims become XAF 600 million, comprising XAF 360 million from the DFI and XAF 240 million from the private bank. The same XAF 450 million recovery then represents 75 percent of senior claims. DFI loss becomes XAF 90 million and private-bank loss becomes XAF 60 million, while the sponsor still loses XAF 400 million.
¶ 05
Comparing the two illustrative recoveries, first-loss support reduces DFI loss by XAF 60 million and private-bank loss by XAF 40 million. The combined XAF 100 million benefit equals the concessional loss. This is the incidence of the support under the stated assumptions. It is not yet evidence of additionality. If the commercial parties would have supplied the larger exposures anyway, the concession has improved their outcomes. If they would not have supplied any viable financing without it, the same transfer may be the necessary cost of mobilisation.
¶ 06
first-loss support reduces DFI loss by XAF 60 million and private-bank loss by XAF 40 millionillustrative
That is why a loss waterfall cannot substitute for the counterfactual. It answers who bears a defined loss after the transaction exists. It cannot answer whether the transaction would exist without support. Both analyses are required, and their results belong in the approval record. Otherwise a structure can present a reduction in commercial loss as a financing achievement while concealing that incumbent financiers were the principal beneficiaries.
¶ 07
Risk retention deserves the same scrutiny. A guarantee or first-loss layer that removes nearly all commercial exposure can weaken the lender's incentive to appraise, monitor and restructure carefully. GFT therefore proposes testing a meaningful retained exposure, aligned reporting and a clear decision process for enforcement or restructuring. These are design recommendations, not universal thresholds. The appropriate retention depends on the instrument, the lender's role and the behaviour the public provider needs to preserve.
¶ 08
The sponsor's position also needs examination. First-loss support that ranks ahead of ordinary equity but behind senior debt may leave the sponsor's recovery unchanged while improving senior terms. That may be justified if the sponsor gains a viable company rather than a direct cash payment. It becomes harder to justify if the sponsor can withdraw cash early, transfer assets to related parties or earn an excessive return while the public layer remains exposed. Distribution restrictions, related-party controls and review rights should follow that analysis.
¶ 09
8.52 min · 7 paragraphs · read with a related exhibit
Technical assistance can address capability rather than subsidise debt
Technical assistance is the narrower intervention when the binding obstacle is missing capability or dependable information rather than the price of capital. A sponsor may need supervisors who can control quality, an environmental and social management system that survives staff turnover, or production records that reconcile good output to collections. Paying those work packages can improve the evidence on which every financier depends. A permanent interest subsidy would not, by itself, create any of them.
The workstream should be separate from the debt documentation and separately costed. Its budget should identify the deliverable, the executing party, the procurement route, the venture's own contribution, the acceptance evidence and the recurrent cost after handover. A report delivered to a sponsor is not the same as a capability operating inside the factory. Acceptance should test use: a supervisor completes an assessment, a meter register reconciles to source readings, or the safeguard owner closes an action with supporting records.
¶ 02
Preparation finance still needs instrument discipline. GCF's Project Preparation Facility describes grants, repayable grants and equity for eligible Accredited Entities and Project Specific Assessment Approach applicants. It assigns responsibilities for procurement, oversight, use and reporting, and states that support leading to a feasible income-generating project should generally be repayable on terms determined during proposal development and review.[S08] This demonstrates why preparation support is not automatically a non-repayable operating subsidy. It does not establish that GFT, the venture or an unnamed partner qualifies for that route.
The content of the assistance should follow the actual constraint. GFT's Cameroon textile programme provides design context through its feasibility, performance-management system and digital-strategy components. That programme is not evidence that a factory has implemented the systems or achieved results. For a proposed blended structure, GFT would translate the relevant components into procurable work packages: supervisor development, manual production records, metering definitions, data reconciliation, safeguard responsibilities and assurance readiness.
¶ 04
Environmental and social work illustrates the ownership test. IFC Performance Standard 1 applies where environmental and social risks and impacts exist, with management through an appropriate management system.[S22] The accompanying Guidance Notes explain the Performance Standards and good practice, but do not replace them.[S34] Technical assistance should therefore leave named operating responsibilities, procedures, records and corrective-action routines. A lender pack prepared externally and never adopted by management would leave the capability gap intact.
¶ 05 · 2 sources
IFC Performance Standard 1 applies where environmental and social risks and impacts existS22
The minimum-concession test also applies to technical assistance. Fund only the increment needed to overcome the defined barrier. Do not pay for a broad corporate consultancy programme because a small metering or training gap is difficult to isolate. Where the work produces private value that the sponsor can reasonably finance, consider sponsorship, cost-sharing or repayment. Where it produces verifiable public learning, define what may be disclosed without exposing legitimately confidential operating information.
¶ 06
8.62 min · 6 paragraphs · 1 exhibit
Subsidy must have a review and exit mechanism
A concession should last only as long as the obstacle that justified it. The review mechanism should therefore follow evidence, not the calendar alone. Relevant signals include accepted machinery, repeatable collections, reconciled production and cash records, completed safeguard actions, demonstrated management capability and credible expressions of commercial financing interest. Each signal needs an owner, a verification method and a decision consequence. An improving narrative without those records is not an exit trigger.
The no-repeat-subsidy case belongs in the original model. Remove future concessional disbursements that are not contractually committed, then test operating cash, debt service, safeguard spending, maintenance and working capital. Include any recurring verification and reporting costs that remain after support ends. If the venture survives only by assuming another donor, the proposal has not established commercial sustainability. IFC's principle that impact should contribute towards commercial viability points directly to this test.[S04]
Exit does not always mean immediate repayment or refinancing. A preparation grant can end with accepted handover evidence. A technical-assistance agreement can close when the venture operates the new capability and funds its recurrent cost. A subordinated instrument can amortise or remain until its agreed maturity without receiving a further public contribution. A guarantee can expire as the covered exposure falls. Refinancing is only one possibility, and it should be counted only when actual terms support it.
¶ 03
Exhibit 36 shows an illustrative review path. The starting concessional share of 10 percent comes from the paper's hypothetical XAF 100 million junior contribution within XAF 1,000 million of capital. Later shares are constructed choices, not forecasts. They decline only if new financing rounds satisfy the stated evidence gates. A falling share must never be produced merely by increasing the denominator while the absolute subsidy continues to grow.
Exhibit 36TrajectoryillustrativeA subsidy should narrow as the financing obstacle falls
01 / 04
Read-out
Method and source
Constructed exit path, not an observed series or promised refinancing. First-close value = illustrative 100 / 1000 × 100 = 10 percent. Values 6, 3 and 0 at later gates are proposed case settings only. Each reduction requires verified operating evidence and commercial terms that make the residual support unnecessary. No dates, automatic withdrawal or new-money commitments are assumed.
Unit: illustrative concessional share of new capital, percent. Status: illustrative. Sources: S04. Illustrative figures are teaching examples, not measured factory results.
Every gate needs three possible decisions, not just continuation and exit. Reduce support when the evidence shows a smaller residual barrier. Redesign the instrument when the barrier persists but its form has changed. Stop when the operating case remains weak or the public cost exceeds the justified benefit. Automatic reduction on a fixed date could destroy a useful demonstration before its evidence exists. Automatic renewal would conceal whether the demonstration has worked.
¶ 01
The final exit review should revisit the original counterfactual. Ask whether commercial providers now accept the exposure, which verified evidence changed their decision, and whether later projects can obtain comparable terms without the same contribution. If the answers remain unclear, retain the uncertainty in the record. A completed disbursement is not proof that a market has been reinforced.
¶ 02
8.72 min · 7 paragraphs · 1 exhibit
Transparency protects both development purpose and confidential terms
Transparency makes the concession inspectable without requiring publication of every commercially sensitive contract. The disclosure record should reveal why support is needed, what it is worth under the stated method, who benefits, what private finance changes, and when support ends. Detailed customer prices, personal information, security credentials and protected supplier terms can remain controlled. The rationale, valuation basis and public exposure should not disappear behind that confidentiality.
IFC states that it discloses subsidy levels and their justification in its Summary of Investment Information, and that an internal blended-finance committee checks adherence to its principles.[S04] GFT treats that as an institutional governance example, not as a rule binding this venture or evidence that any provider will accept its proposal. The transferable lesson is to separate recommendation from approval: the team designing the concession should not be the only team testing its necessity and incidence.
Exhibit 37 proposes a disclosure record that keeps the main judgements visible. Amounts should distinguish committed, available and disbursed states. Beneficiaries should include indirect incidence where a lender's loss or sponsor's return changes. Results should carry their period, source and verification status. Confidentiality exceptions should identify the protected field and the reason rather than suppress the entire analysis.
Exhibit 37RegisterillustrativeA concessional decision needs an inspectable public-purpose record
Field
Market failure
Minimum record
Obstacle, evidence and distortion risk
Control purpose
Prevent a generic policy rationale
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Open the full register (8 rows)
Market failure
Obstacle, evidence and distortion risk
Prevent a generic policy rationale
Counterfactual
Same-scope unsupported case
Test whether support changes the decision
Concession value
Instrument, reference, cash flows and method
Make subsidy reproducible
Beneficiaries
Sponsor, DFI, private lender and public incidence
Expose transfers and retained risk
Mobilisation
Provider type, commitment state and attribution
Prevent double counting
Development results
Baseline, outcome, source and attribution limit
Separate impact from finance
Review and exit
Evidence gate, owner, decision and residual cost
Limit duration and dependence
Confidentiality
Protected field, reason and controlled summary
Preserve accountability without over-disclosure
Method and source
GFT proposed governance template. It does not reproduce an institution's mandatory form or require disclosure of legitimately protected commercial terms. Mobilisation categories and attribution method are proposals for transaction-specific agreement. Development outcomes remain separate from financing additionality.
Unit: proposed disclosure and assurance register. Status: illustrative. Sources: S03, S04, S26. Illustrative figures are teaching examples, not measured factory results.
Mobilisation reporting needs especially strict definitions. Sponsor equity is not automatically capital mobilised by the concession, because it may have been committed before support was considered. DFI own-account finance should be shown separately from private commercial finance and from donor resources. The concessional contribution itself is never private mobilisation. If several interventions occur together, the method should state whether capital is attributed wholly, proportionally or only descriptively. Totals must reconcile to the sources-and-uses statement without counting one commitment twice.
¶ 01
Commitment states matter as much as categories. An indicative discussion, an approved amount, a signed facility and a cash disbursement are not interchangeable. Report each on its actual date and retain undrawn conditions. The OECD's observation about relatively limited private mobilisation cautions against presenting a large headline ratio as self-evident success.[S03] A smaller amount of genuinely additional finance may be more useful than a large total that includes capital already present.
Development reporting must remain on a separate axis. The venture can report jobs, production, resource use and local value only with their own baselines and methods. AIMM's explicit separation of expected development impact from additionality reinforces that boundary.[S26] Achieving an operating result after receiving support does not prove that the concession caused the whole result, just as obtaining commercial finance does not prove development value.
GFT's recommended approval sequence is therefore restrictive. Reject blending when the market failure is undefined, the unsupported case already works, or the operating model remains structurally weak. Where a genuine barrier remains, choose the smallest intervention that removes it, disclose its incidence, fund the associated measurement, and make continued support conditional on verified progress. Concessional capital then becomes a bounded instrument for changing a financing decision, not a permanent feature of the business model.
¶ 04
Check the record
The chapter keeps its sources within reach.
Every knot is a source this chapter cites; select one to read its record, or filter the register by grade. Publication dates and inherited-source limits stay explicit. Read the paper's full evidence summary.
7 sources · 23 citation marks on this pageMost cited: S04, 8 times
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c08-S03 · Grade B
OECD
OECD DAC Blended Finance Guidance 2025
Blended finance has not scaled as rapidly as hoped and has mobilised relatively limited private finance.
2025-09-22. Register access date: 2026-10-30. Source provenance is supplied by the paper evidence register.
Move the shuttle along the rack to preview any chapter: its sections, exhibits and reading time. Draft web edition. This research is not investment, legal or tax advice; illustrative models are not measured factory results.
The paper's rack · 14 boltsBolt length: reading time
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
1.10
1.15
01Part I: Repayment must precede instrument selection
A first line earns finance by proving repayment
GFT argues that measured repayment capacity and controlled execution must come before a development-finance or green label.
1.1The processing gap is a reason to investigate, not a source of repayment
1.3The first financed scope must remain smaller than the full value chain
1.5Four tests separate a credible proposal from a sustainability narrative
1.7A financing label cannot repair an uneconomic operating model
05Part II: Capital must carry the risks it can absorb
Institutional fit matters before a financing application
A sponsor should select a direct, intermediated or syndicated route using eligibility, scale, mandate and evidence before spending money on an application.
5.1Direct IFC access has eligibility conditions and practical boundaries
5.2Intermediated finance can be the relevant route for a first line
5.3Published lender products are a screening input, not an offer
5.4A co-financed loan needs aligned decision and documentation processes
10Part III: Sustainable finance must survive verification
Performance-linked finance needs a credible baseline first
A first textile line should adopt linked pricing only after its baseline, targets and verification rules can withstand changes in production and reporting.
10.1Sustainability-linked finance is not restricted to green invoices
10.2A greenfield baseline requires explicit treatment of commissioning
10.3Material KPIs should resist changes in product mix and output
10.4Targets must exceed business as usual on a defined timetable